Towards an understanding of changing accounting practice using institutional theory: the case of the royal tobacco factory of Seville by Carmona, Salvador et al.
-t----------'"------------"-----------------"------------------

Working Paper 95-49 Departamento de Economía de la Empresa 
Business Economics Series 07 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
November 1995 Cal1e Madrid, 126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (341) 624-9608 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGING ACCOUNTING
 
PRACTICE USING INSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
 
THE CASE OF THE ROYAL TOBACCO FACTORY OF SEVILLE
 
Salvador Carmona, Mahmolld Ezzamel and Fernando Gutiérrez'
 
Abstract
 
This paper is initial1y informed byan institutional theoretical framework developed by Fligstein (1993) to analyse
 
changes in accounting practices that took place in the Royal Tobacco Factory (RTF) of Seville during the period
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TO\VARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGING ACCOUNTING
 
!JRACTICE USING INSTITUTIONAL TI-lEORY:
 
Tlle Case of the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville
 
INTRODUCTION
 
"AltIlOUgh all movements ebb and flow, the interest in institutions has, during 
the past two decades, swelled into a sizeable flood 01 work, both theoretical 
and empirical. And there is no sign 01 diminishing interest" (Scott, 1995, 
p133). 
The aboye quote taken from a recent book written by a leading sociologist neatly sums up 
the increasing interest by academics in utilising institutional sociological theory to gain an 
infonned understanding of organisational activities. This increased interest in the institutional 
approach to studying organizations has not been restricted to sociology but has spread across 
disciplines such as economics, political science, strategy and international management 
(Scott, 1995, p. 134). Accounting academics have also been quick to adapt institutional 
sociology to their research agendas (for sorne recent examples see Hunt III and Hogler, 1993; 
Carruthers, 1995; Edwards, Ezzamel, Robson and Taylor, 1995). 
It is comparatively easy to provide several explanations that account for this popularity of 
institutional sociology, but only a brief listing of them is warranted in this paper (see 
Fligstein, 1993 and Scott, 1995 for more detailed discussions). First, institutional sociology 
focuses attention on knowledge and rule systems constructed within organizations in addition 
to cultural and nonnative frameworks in organizational environments, rather than focus more 
on the latter as earlier frameworks (such as resource dependence and contingency theory) 
have. Second, institutional theory can be seen to offer a bridge linking various disciplines 
that could benefit from focusing upon institutions, for example economics, political science 
and, indeed, accounting. Third, institutional analysis broadens the scope of enquiry to 
include organizational fields (to be defined later) and pennits an examination of interactions 
among the organizations belonging to a particular field, and these have been presented as 
yielding a better understanding of organizational action than previously (e.g. Fligstein, 1993). 
These arguments led Scott (1995, p136) to contend that: 
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"Al! organizatíons are institutionalized organizations. T!lis is tme botlz in t!le 
narr01Ver sense that al! organizations are subject lO important rcgulatíve 
processes and operate uncler fhe colltrol 01 botlz local ami more general 
governance structures, as wel! as in the broader sense rhar al! organizatíons 
are social!y constituted and are fhe subject 01 insriflltional processes tlzat 
define wlzat forms rlzey can assume alld !low they mal' operate legitimarely". 
Also, more critically for this paper, interest in institutional analysis has engendered a greater 
awareness of the importance of history. Zald (1990) has argued that in considering interest 
in history from the perspective of institutional analysis, time matters for two reasons. First, 
historical analysis contributes to an understanding of institutional context by focusing on 
changes in organizational context over time which affects what organizations do and how they 
behave. Second, historical analysis yields an informed understanding of how each 
organization in its own right develops over time and how such developments impact upon the 
organization ' s specific structural arrangements and scope for action. 
This paper uses an institutional theory framework to contextualize and interpret changes in 
financial and cost accounting practices that took place in the Royal Tobacco Factory of 
Seville (Spain) during the period 1760 to 1790. The historical material used in this paper 
has been drawn from the original archives (Archivo de Tabacalera. S.A.) which are currently 
located in the more modero building of the tobacco factory in the city of Seville. As 
explained later, this period witnessed a number of events (variations) that were accompanied 
with the development of new accounting practices. The main aim of the paper is to gain and 
informed understanding of the conditions that made possible the development of these new 
accounting practices. The nature of the archival material makes it possible to contextualize 
the emergence of new accounting practices in specific institutional and cultural settings over 
three decades. Another aim of this paper is asses the claims, discussed above in brief and 
later in more detail, made by many writers concerning the analytical power of institutional 
sociology particularly in the case of longitudinal historical material such as the one used in 
this papero Our subsequent analysis suggests that institutional sociology has much to offer 
in explaining specific parteros of organisational actions and the emergence of new 
organisational practices such as accounting. We conclude, however, that the institutional 
sociology framework can be problematical and that the claims made on its behalf may be 
overstated. 
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The remainder 01' the papel' is organized as follows. In the ncxt section \Ve provide a brief 
overview 01' an institutional sociology framework developcd by Fligstein (e.g. 1993) which 
dl'aws upon much 01' the mainstream institutional sociology litel'ature. This is folIowed by 
a dcscription 01' the tobacco industl'Y in Spain and a chronology 01' tobacco production in the 
Royal Tobacco Factory (RTF) 01' Seville during the late 17th centul'Y and the 18th century. 
Ina separate section, we document the emergence 01' new accounting (financial and costing) 
practices in the RTF during the period 1760-1790 using institutional sociological analysis. 
We then discuss the implications 01' the use institutional sociological theory to analyse 
changes in accounting practice before we summarise our main conc1usions. 
AN INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY FRAMEWORK 
In this section we sketch out briefIy the main features 01' a framework developed within 
institutional sociology which we later explore more critically in terms of its ability to explain 
and account for the development of new accounting practices in the RTF. The particular 
framework we discuss here is the one developed by Fligstein in a series of papers (1985, 
1987, 1990a, 1990b) which were formalised subsequent1y in a book (1993). Fligstein's 
framework has been heavi1y infIuenced by much of the prior work in institutional sociology, 
particularly the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), White (1981), Aldrich (1982), DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) and Hannan and Freeman (1984).His main concern was to use 
institutional sociology to gain an understanding of the long-term shifts in the conception of 
how the largest USA firms operated over time (particular1y during the period 1919-1979) 
to preserve their growth and profitability. 
Instead of identifying managers and entrepreneurs as optimisers of satisfiers, Fligstein prefers 
to focus on the construction of new courses of action based on managers'analysis of the 
problems of control they face. His framework is premised on three institutional contexts in 
which organizational transformation takes place. First, each organization is embedded in an 
organizational field which may be defined in terms of product line, industry or finn size. 
Each organizational field comprises a large group of organizations inc1uding competitors in 
the main, but also, suppliers, distributors or owners. Second, organizational action is 
constrained by rules set by the state that define the limits of legal behaviour. Third, 
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organizational behaviour is constrained further by strategies, stmctures, and technologies 
deployed in the firn1 in addition to the firm's own physical limits (these are the firm's own 
internal environment). 
For Fligstein, the main goal of managers over the past hundred years has been to ensure their 
firms survival; hence the contention that the main role of organizational fields is to promote 
stability (the status quo) for their members. Organizational fields are presented in Fligstein' s 
analysis (1993, p6) as "the basic mechanism of control of the external environment available 
to managers and entrepreneurs". Managerial action is seen as emanating from a given 
conception of control, formed by managers, which are based on simplified assumptions 
concerning how the world should be analyzed. Such conceptions of control are "totalizing 
world views that cause actors to interpret every situation from a given perspective", (1993, 
plO). 
With this framework in hand, Fligstein set about to examine how the conceptions of control 
in the largest USA firms were transformed from 1880 onwards. His analysis led him to 
identify four sI?ecific conceptions of control: direct control of competitors, manufacturing 
control, sales and marketing control, and finance control. These conceptions of control are 
not "disembodied, idealist constructs" (pI2) but rather have emerged from interactions within 
organizational fields and have been constrained and mediated by the state, that is they are 
social constructions. New conceptions of control emerge when the organizational field is 
destabilised. 
Direct control of competitors as a conception of control emerged in the late 19th century in 
response to the absence of rules governing competitive behaviour and the instability of 
organizational fields. During that phase three strategies were deployed with the purpose of 
lessening competitíon: predatory trade practices, cartelization and monopolization. While 
this conception of control extended well into the 20th century, the manufacturing conception 
of control started to emerge and its main vehicles for containing competition were the 
stabilization of the production process and the creation of oligopolistic pricing conditíons in 
organizational fields. These were achieved through vertical and horizontal integration to 
absorb suppliers and marketing functions, and hence reduce the firm's external dependence, 
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and aIso to increase firm size to enhance its overall stability. The sales and marketing 
conception of control arose out of the marketing revolution of the 1920s and became 
dominant in the post Second World War era. The problem of control was perceived as the 
selling of goods and hence the emphasis shifted f1'om combating competition to engineering 
new ways to increase sales by expanding into existing markets and creating new ma1'kets. 
Hence, the strategy that evolved was concerned with growth by non-predatory competition. 
This \Vas achieved through a combinatíon of product quality and price differentiation, 
increased adve1'tising and market expansiono The fourth conception of control, which is 
dominant currently, is finance-based as it seeks to emphasise control through greater reliance 
upon financial measures of performance rooted in short-term profit rates. Firms are viewed 
as collections of assets earning differential asset returns rather than as producers of goods. 
Shareholders wealth maximisation is the key objective and managers are constantly looking 
for ways to maximise short-term profit by changing product-mix. This conception of control 
is implemented through strategies such as diversification through mergers and divestments, 
raising finance through debt, identification of take-over targets, and using financial controls 
to effect internal allocation of capital. 
These successive conceptions of control are related in the sense that each was built on the 
insights that carne before it but this does not mean that each conception of control gave rise 
to its successor. Rather, each conception emerged as the outcome of interactions in the 
organizational field with the state. But ultimately, for Fligstein (1993, p. 17) "the power 
struggle within the firm determines which conception of control will dominate and how that 
conception will be translated into concrete strategies. The winners of this struggle will push 
the organization into a certain direction and maintain that direction as long as their strategies 
bring positive results" , 
We will suspend our evaluation of the institutional sociology perspective in general and 
Fligstein' s framework in particular until after we present the archival evidence, but suffice 
it to say at this stage that this approach has sorne import for our paper but also sorne major 
shortcomings. Before we proceed to the next section, however, we need to establish 
potential close links between Fligstein ' s framework and the emergence of specific accounting 
practices. Taking Fligstein' s framework at face value for the time being, it is easy to 
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establish a link between each of his four conceptions of control and specific accounting 
practices. Fligstein, a sociologist with perhaps little or even no direct interest in accounting 
practice, has none-the-Iess idclltified accounting as the major focus in the operation of the 
finance conception of control: "the basic insight of the finance conception was that such a 
firm could be more tightly controlled by strict accounting" (1993, p. 16). It would therefore 
be possible to identify the emergence of specific accounting practices that, for example, focus 
on quantifying short-term performance and assessing the profitability rates of bundles of 
assets with the development of the finance conception of control. Similarly, one can extend 
this analysis further by postulating that specific accounting practices are closely aligned with 
certain conceptions of control; as emphasis shifts from one conception of control to another 
one should observe a shift in accounting practices more aligned to the new conception of 
control. This line of argument is plausible but it also has very strong deterministic overtones 
which we will examine more critically later. Attention, however, is now turned to providing . 
a brief description of the tobacco industry in Spain. 
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN SPAIN 
During the 16th and early 17th centuries the tobacco industry in Spain was organized in 
small, family ron workshops until it carne under state controllater on in the 17th century and 
became organized as a state monopoly. In the main, the new monopoly was coordinated and 
controlled by the Tobacco Agency (Dirección General de la Renta). The city of Seville was 
grated by a Royal decree the privilege of producing tobacco and in 1684 tobacco production 
was located in the Factory of San Pedro (Fábrica de San Pedro) in downtown Seville. 
Although a small tobacco factory was built in Cadiz, by 1718 this factory had become 
insignificant and fully dependent upon the factory in Seville so that the latter effectively 
became the sole tobacco producer in Spain. Over time, tobacco consumption in Span became 
very popular as tobacco sales volume rose from 1.1 million pounds in 1701 to 3.2 million 
pounds in 1740. 
This increase in tobacco sales was accompanied by an increase in the production capacity of 
the San Pedro Factory through the purchasing and renting of additional buildings close to the 
Factory. Factory space, however, remained at a premium given the sharp increase in 
6 
tobacco sales, and this in addition to the desire to minimise the scope for tobacco theft that 
\Vas so frequent in the San Pedro Factory and to improve manufacturing discipline (Morales 
Sánchez, 1991; Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 1994) cuhninated in the issuing of a 
Royal decree in 1723 to build new factory premises outside the city walls. The New 
Factories (Nuevas Fábricas), which had a production capacity two and a half times that of 
the old factory (San Pedro) and which were built like a fortress to reduce tobacco theft, were 
completed in 1758 and full production there was well under way by the 1760s. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 shows how the tobacco industry was organized as a state monopoly and the role 
played by the RTF within that industry. Tobacco leaves were imported into Spain from the 
Americas by the Havana Company prior to their transfer to the RTF for manufacturing into 
snuff and cigars. Once completed, snuff and tobacco products were sent from the RTF to 
another unit, Estanco del Tabaco which was responsible for tobacco distribution and sale, and 
the tobacco revenue was then transferred by the Tobacco Agency to the Crown Treasury. 
Hence, within the overall organization of the Spanish tobacco monopoly, the RTF was the 
manufacturing link, and because of this it was internally organized into two sets of more 
detailed cost centres, one for snuff production and the other for cigar production. 
In institutional analysis terms, we can easily locate the three institutional contexts that form 
the pillars of Fligstein' s work: the organizational field; the state rules; and organization 
specific constraints. In the case of the RTF, its organizational field comprised the Havana 
Company, the Distribution Company, the Tobacco Agency, and also any external producer 
or distributor of tobacco operating illegally outside the monopoly, of whom there were quite 
a few (Goodman, 1994). The actions of these members of the organizational field would 
have had immediate implications for the scope for action available to the RTF, as these 
members impacted on the supply of raw materials, tobacco production, and distribution of 
output. State rules, detailing the constraints desired by the Spanish Crown, were formally 
issued in the form of Royal decrees which were subsequentIy entrusted to the Tobacco 
Agency to see to their strict implementation. Finally, the RTF had its own production plans, 
organizational structure, production technologies and physical space which, while somewhat 
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changeable, posed some important limitations on rhe RTF' s ahility to pursue specific courses 
of action. 
Tobacco production, both in the üld and New Factories, comprised both snuff and cigars. 
The earliest year for which we have a breakdown of statistics on consumption of each 
product is 1740 and the results show sorne interesting variatiolls both in terms of the relative 
consumption of the two products and the total consumption of both products combined over 
time - this is shown in Table 1 below. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The Table reveals a number of changes in the pattern of tobacco consumption. First, annual 
snuff consumption as a proportion of total tobacco consumption declined over the period 
from 67.4% in 1740 to only 37.8% in 1798 in comparison with a corresponding rise in cigar 
consumption. Given that the design of the New Factories was premised on providing much 
Iarger production capacity for snuff compared to tobacco (which was the pattern of 
consumption in the decades preceding the building of the New Factories) there was now a 
problem facing the management of the New Factories as to how to adapt the snuff production 
facilities to produce more cigars. A second, and perhaps more serious problem was the 
steady decline in total tobacco consumption during the period 1770-1780 (taking 1770 as a 
base year, this decline amounted to nearly 15 % and reached 24 % by 1798). The scale of 
the probIem was even more severe given the much larger production capacity of the New 
Factories as these production volumes could have been easily produced in the San Pedro 
(Old) Factory. 
The dramatic shift in product mix away from snuff consumption towards more cigar 
consumption coupled with the significant decline in total tobacco production after the 1770s 
onwards almost paradoxicany rendered the new, much larger and more expensive factories 
obsolete. The management of the RTF was under strong pressure to demonstrate its 
competence by taking necessary steps to effect the requisite switch in production facilities to 
reflect the changes in product mix as wen as to engineer ways of improving the Oyeran 
utilization of factory production capacity. 
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Two additional arguments made the situation \Vorse for the management of the Nc\V 
Factories. First, in arder to protect and strengthen further the monopolistic powcr of the 
RTF, there was strong pressure on management to reduce the price of tobacco while 
maintaining high product quality so that barricrs to entry are made more difficult. This \Vas 
decmed necessary given the scope for producing tobacco illegally outside the monopoly and 
the high profit margins that could be achieved. Second, there \Vas strong pressure on 
management to maximise the Crown' s intake of tobacco revenue. Over the years the Crown 
became increasingly more dependent upon tobacco revenue and during the 1730-1775 period 
tobacco income as proportion of total Crown income increased from 13 % to 28 % (Artola, 
1982). Taking these two arguments together meant that the management of the RTF had to 
pursue various means to improve production efficiency and minimise production cost in order 
to be able to both reduce tobacco prices while securing at least a minimum level of income 
for the Crown. 
This brief chronology of the development of tobacco production in the RTF makes it possible 
to identify three main events (or discontinuities) which we seek to link to the emergence of 
new financial and cost accounting practices: 
1.	 The move to the New Factories in the 1760s. 
2.	 The decline in the overall consumption of total tobacco which became particularly 
pronounced after the 1770s. 
3.	 The pressure to keep tobacco prices down as a deterrent against entry while at the 
same time increasing tobacco revenue for the Crown; this was to be achieved 
through reducing production cost but without sacrificing quality. 
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES IN THE RTF 
It will be recalled (see Figure 1) that within the overall organization of the tobacco monopoly 
the RTF was essentially an aggregation of cost centres that was responsible for the 
conversion of raw materials into finished products of snuff and cigars. As a production 
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facility, the RTF received cash inflows from de Tobacco Agency in order to be able to 
undertake the manufacturing activities. In return, the RTF was required to report to the 
Tobacco Agency on its manufacturing activities through the cargo and data (charge and 
discharge) method of bookkeeping which allowed the Tobacco Agency to monitor strictly the 
application of the cash inflows within the RTF. The RTF therefore enjoyed little autonomy 
in its relationship with the Tobacco Agency. Our aim in this section is to examine the extent 
to which the emergence of new financial and cost accounting practices in the RTF can be 
linked to the three events identified in the previous section, namely the move to the New 
Factories, the pressure to switch production facilities to reflect changes in product mix and 
the desire to increase the overall utilization of factory capacity coupled with the incentive to 
keep tobacco prices low while maximising tobacco revenue for the Crown. 
The design of the cargo and data (charge and discharge) bookkeeping system made possible 
the splitting of cash inflows as a general accounting series into a number of applications (or 
detailed accounting series), with each particular application in turn comprising a number of 
sub-applications. In addition to these financial reporting series there were accounting series 
concerning raw materials, work in progress, and finished goods (i.e. accounting I?rocedures 
for controlling inventory), as well as other factory based activities, susch as the accounting 
series dealing with payrolls, consumption of horse fodder, etc. Below we trace out the 
emergence of new accounting series (summarised in Table 2) identifying new accounting 
procedures that may be linked to the events identified aboye. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
As the first major discontinuity we are concerned with here starts with the move to the New 
Factories in the 1760s, we contrast the development of new accounting procedures from that 
period onwards against the accounting procedures that were operating at the RTF prior to the 
1760s. As Table 2 shows, there were 33 accounting series in operation in the RTF in the 01d 
San Pedro Factory until 1760. A detailed breakdown of these series in the Archives shows 
that they were c1assified into two main groups; the first related to those that were intented 
for preparation in the Accounting Office (twenty seven series) and the second related to those 
to be elaborated in the Factories (six series). 
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TlJe series intended for use in the Accounting Office contained accounl ing practices th:H d¡·:::t 
\Vith general tobacco business matters including sorne aggregate accounting inform(j¡ic!11 
reporting on the performance of the Factories. Thus, eight series cIealt with inflo\''', ;ti Id 
outflows of a~d.to the warehouse and reports submitted to the Tobacco Agency, incllldillg 
conso!idated inflows and outtlows of tobacco reports for the snuff and cigarfactories. Thae 
were also nine series detailing the accounting practices concerning the inflow and outflo\\' of 
cash with respect to matters such as rents collected, salary and wage payments, etc. Tbree 
more series dealt with cargo and data entries for the snuff alld cigar factories, two series 
dealt with Factory bills paid, one series dea!t with snuff tobacco delivered from the Factory, 
one more series covered practices related to documentations of tobacco leaves imported from 
Havana (Cuba) and awaiting processing, and the last three series dealt with sundry itcms. 
The series for use in the Factories covered items such as bills, payrolls and sundry materials 
(for example, horse fodder, oil, tins, etc) which were detailed for each of the snuff and cigar 
Factories. 
These accounting series, which were developed over several years, continued to operate in 
their totality as the accounting system for the RTF while production was located in the old 
San Pedro Factory. While the conception of control during that period could be seen to be 
manufacturing-focused, the accounting practices contained in these thirty three series, it is 
plausible to argue, would have been seen as sufficient for the measurement and reporting of 
snuff and cigar activities. These practices became embedded and institutionalized in the 
activities of the San Pedro Factory with little or change in them once they were introduced 
and became established. 
Interestingly for our purposes, as Table 2 demonstrates, the move to the New Factories and 
the events relating to the dynamics of the product mix and tobacco consumption, mark a 
significant change in accounting practices as reflected in the number of the new series issued 
and those discontinued. During the decade irnmediately following the move to the New 
Factories (1760-1770) thirty one new series were launched and four old ones were discarded. 
The sheer number of changes is impressive in its own right (since the total number of series 
used during that decade was nearly twice as large as that used in the old Factory) but a 
detailed analysis of these dynamics reveals even more insights. Of the four series that were 
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discontinued, one related to tobacco leaves imported 1'ro111 Havana because of the 
reorganization of tobacco imports amI three were related to general accounting practices. 
These latter three were replaced with two new series which revised and updated them. A 
further new series was developed for the General Accounting Officc to specifically provide 
monthly and weekly cash statements. Five more new series were concerned with cash, the 
aim of which was to provide more detailed cash inflows, in addition to more detailed 
accounting for payrolls inc1uding items such as daily payments to operators in the snuff 
factory, loans advanced to white-coIlar personnel and deductions from their salaries to 
account for interest on loans and social security benefits. Two series deaIt with personnel 
and were kept in the office of general manager. The remaining twenty one series related 
indirectly or directly to snuff and cigar factories, a staggering increase in factory-based 
accounting given that only twelve of the thirty three series used in the old San Pedro Factory 
were directly devoted to manufacturing. This statistic suggests that the increase in factory 
accounting series during 1760-1769 decade was linked to the significantly increased emphasis 
on manufacturing during the same period - to cope with the change in factory premises, the 
shift in product mix, and the focus on low cost, high quality products and improved 
utilization of manufacturing capacity. Thus, the accounting series for the snuff factory that 
were used before 1760 which simply focused on receipts and distribution were augmented 
to deal with general tobacco processing (beneficios) and packaging (fermentación). Eight 
new series were launched to improve accounting for that factory, but they were c1assified 
under General Accounting, two of each for receipts, general tobacco processing, packaging, 
and distribution. These series also dealt with cargo and data of tobacco materials, weekly 
production, monthly payments, etc. The practices contained in these series were kept by the 
foremen of the various production stages; indeed sorne of these posts were created after the 
move to the New Factories. Three more series dealing with factory accounts, but at the 
same time being c1assified under the Accounting Office, as in the case of the aboye eight 
series, were concerned with improving warehouse management and monitoring and 
controlling the number of cigars made by each operator in the cigar factory. 
Ten new series intended for use in the factories were directly related to manufacturing 
dealing further with receipts, tobacco processing, packaging and distribution particularly in 
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tlle snuff factory. They emphasised cargo and data of tobacco materials and the daily control 
of tobacco processcd in every stage of the production process. 
During the nexttwo decades (1770-1990), two accounting series that were uscd in the 1760s 
were discontinued; one relating to general processing in the snuff factory and one relating 
to the General Accounting Office. However, thirteen new series were launched; four for 
use in the General Accounting Office and nine for use in the factories. The new series 
developed for the Accounting Office dealt with the inflow and outflow (movement) of 
tobacco, payrolls, social security benefits for white-collar employees, and matters relating 
to the office of the General Manager. The new series developed for use at factory level dealt 
with cargo and data for warehouses (yielding more detailed calculations thap previously), 
wages of operators in charge of horses and the inflow and outflow of tobacco in the snuff 
factory, and tobacco inflow and outflow relating to a snuff product called rapé which was 
produced by the RTF for the first time during that period (the new product differed from 
other snuff products in terros of both type of raw materials used and production processes). 
We have already indicated that the vast majority of the new accounting series launched 
during the 1760-1790 period were related to factory operations whether intended for use in 
the General Accounting Office or in the factories themselves. A further breakdown of the 
new accounting series by factory reveals another interesting dimension: of the thirty one new 
series issued in the period 1760-1790 and relating to the factories (either for use in the 
Accounting Office or the factories), six related to warehouses, and only one to the cigar 
factory in contrast to twenty four for the snuff factory. We can offer several explanations 
for the major imbalance in the number of accounting series devoted to snuff manufacturing 
compared to cigar manufacturing. 
First, as indicated earlier, a new snuffproduct called rapé which used different raw materials 
and went through different production stages to those of other snuffproducts in the RTF was 
introduced during the 1770-1790 periodo New accounting practices emerged to account for 
and monitor this new product, culminating in the launching of three series. But this still 
leaves twenty one new series for snuff manufacturing compared to only one new series for 
cigar manufacturing. 
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A second and quite an important explanation, relates to differences in the manufacturing 
t¡;chnologies used in the cigar and snuff factories. Thc manufacturing tcchnology of cigars 
\Vas based on handiwork as production \Vas highly individualised with very skilled operators 
each carrying out the entire job of rolling the tobacco leaves into finished cigars. Each cigar 
operator \Vas paid on the basis of a piece-rate system where operators were paid only for 
perfect cigars and upon meeting a minimum production target. Control was therefore 
internalised into the production process itself an in the operation of the reward system. As 
cigar production could not be easily routinised (due to the high individual skills required) and 
segmented into a series of sequential production processes minimal accounting practices were 
used to monitor production, and the reward system of piece rate in addition to physical 
inspection of cigars produced were deemed sufficient to monitor the cigar operations. 
In a sharp contrast, snuff operators were paid a fixed daily wage as snuff was produced 
through six distinct stags: drying tobacco leaves, grinding, moistening, fine grinding, 
packaging, and storage (Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 1994). Moreover, the skilllevels 
required in snuff production were far more modest than those required in cigar production. 
Because the premises of the Old San Pedro factory developed in a rather haphazard way, 
these production stages were not as finely tuned and c1arified as such c1assification had to 
await the new, purpose-built factories. Once production moved to the New Factories the 
newly found c1arity of the production stages lent itself readily to greater accounting 
monitoring as each production stage became gradually more routinised. AIso, given the 
payment of fixed wages daily the absence of a payment incentive for snuff operators had to 
be compensated for through increased accounting-based accountability. 
We also discern a third explanation for the significantly larger number of accounting series 
for snuff compared to cigars. As indicated earlier (see Table 1), annual consumption of snuff 
dec1ined constantly over the 1740-1798 period so that by 1798 snuff consumption was less 
than half its level in 1740. Given this downward trend and the decline in total tobacco 
consumption during the 1770-1798 period, there was much greater pressure to cut the cost 
of producing snuff in order to reduce snuff prices and hence boost demand, and in order to 
increase profit margins per pound of snuff. This pressure was much less obvious in the case 
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of tlle cigar production given the significant increase in cigar consumption over the same 
periodo 
In order to provide further evidence on the intentions of these new accounting practices we 
refer briefiy to the contents of some of these practices by way of iIlustratian. One example 
relates to an accounting series with cargo and data in the snuff factory which was launched 
in 1762 and remained in operation until1838. The series contained tlle following documcnts 
(see Figures 2, 3 and 4). 
INSERT FIGURES 2,3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
1.	 Grinding f.ill:gQ and data (Bundle 1367): This document contains infIows and outfIows 
of tobacco in each grinding mill (Figure 2) and also provides information concerning 
final inventory and scrap. Information was ca1culated daily and subsequently 
aggregated into monthly figures. 
2.	 Fine grinding cargo and data (Bundle 1367): This document contains infIows and 
outfIows of tobacco, the latter subsequently delivered to the packaging stage (Figure 
2). 
3.	 Moistening operations: In this document (Figure 3) the cargo is entered on the left 
page and the data on the right page. It contains accounting entries relating to tobacco 
delivered to the fine grinding stage and it concludes with a final sununary. 
4.	 Cargo document with entries from the drying stage to grinding and fine grinding 
stages. 
5.	 Data book documenting dried leaves as received by the grinding and fine grinding 
stages. 
6.	 Overall cargo and data of the grinding stage (Bundle 1636) which was aggregated on 
a month1y basis for every type of tobacco (Figure 4). 
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7. Cargo and data of the grinding stage dctailed by each mill (Figure 4). 
8. Cargo and data of the fine grinding stage detailed by each mill (Figure 4). 
Similarly, an accounting series (Bundle 1365) which was launched in 1762 and continued in 
operation until 1847, was concerned with the internal control of foremen in the snuff factory 
(Figure 5). The document details the quantity of tobacco milled each day for every type of 
tobacco. These daily figures were aggregated monthly and were then entered into the cargo 
and data book for the grinding and fine grinding stages discussed above. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
DISCUSSION 
The main purpose of this section is to explore the extent to which the data relating to the 
RTF conforms to institutional analysis, particularly as spelt out in Fligstein's framework, and 
to identify any instances that show tensions or limitations in instituional sociology. In 
describing the institutional setting in which the RTF operated, we have already identified the 
organizational field, the state rules and the constraints specific to the RTF. Although the 
only legitimate maker of snuff and cigars in Spain by virtue of its monopolistic privileges, 
the actions of the management of the RTF were strongly influenced by its relationships with 
the Havana Company (as the supplier of tobacco leaves), the Distribution Company (as the 
unit within the monopoly responsible for the sale of finished snuff and cigars), and illegal 
tobacco smugglers and makers in the black market. Production plans and levels of capacity 
utilisation in the factories depended to a large extent on the ability of the Havana Company 
to secure regular supplies of high quality tobacco leaves, and on the capabilities of the 
Distribution Company to selllarge volumes of snuff and cigars. Moreover, the presence of 
a substantial illegal trade in tobacco outside the monopoly (e.g. Goodman, 1994) despite 
severe state sanctions meant that the management of the RTF had to pursue alternative 
strategies to contain and, hopefully, marginalise such illegal activities. This strategy involved 
an increased focus on product quality and at the same time, driving cost of production down. 
The strategy was aimed at both differentiating the RTF products from those traded illegally 
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(both in tenns of higher quality and lower costs) and creating a perception of overall 
efficiency in arder to minimise the chances of new entry (through the crcation of additional 
production factories by the state). 
State rules were typicalIy issued in the form of Royal Decrees or Regulati'ons which in the 
main were administered by the Tobacco Agency (see Figure 1). These Decrees and 
Regulations determined thc scope for action by the RTF; they stipulated the rules according 
to which the RTF was to function in terms of having the privilege of being the sole legitimate 
producer of snuff and cigars, the high levels of production efficiency expected from the RTF 
in return, in addition to the securing of significant revenues for the Royal Treasury. The 
Spanish Crown maintained a regular interest in important developments in the RTF, including 
the receipt of reports on the findings of significant experiments aimed at improving 
production efficiency and the appointment and rewarding of key personnel in the RTF 
(Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 1994). Moreover, many of the accounting series 
discussed earlier, particularly those concerned with financial reporting, were developed and 
imposed by the Tobacco Agency acting on behalf of the state. 
Over the period of investigation (1760-1790), the organization-specific constraints shifted 
very noticeably. While operating in the Old San Pedro Factory, the RTF had its production 
activities spread ayer several buildings rendering the production stages, particularly for snuff, 
ambiguous, thereby posing serious problems for control (given the ambiguity of production 
stages as well as location of production activities in several different buildings), and also 
imposing severe limits on production levels given the difficulty of expanding physical 
facilities. The move the New Factories marked a relaxation of these restrictions. In the 
newly purpose-built factories, production capacity was enlarged significantly, and all 
production stages for snuff were located in one large space on the same floor thereby making 
the production stages much clearer and also rendering them readily susceptible to direct 
monitoring. But as these constraints were relaxed, new ones emerged: the pressure to fully 
utilise thenow much larger production capacity; the difficu1ty posed by the decline in total 
tobacco consumption after 1770; and the challenge to reorganize production facilities given 
the significant change in consumption parteros away from snuff and towards cigars. 
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Invoking Fligstein' s framework, it can be readily demonstrated that throughout the 1760-1790 
period the main conception of control was manufacturing-based. Designed as a monopoly 
tobacco activities were all concentrated within the Tobacco Agency and organized through 
both horizontal and vertical integration. The various small, family-based workshops that 
operated before the monopoly was established were now horizontally integrated within the 
RTF, and production levels in the Cadiz factory had become so insignificant by 1718 that 
the RTF soon afterwards became effectively the only legitimate producer of snuff and cigars 
in Spain. Further, the supply of raw materials (mainly tobacco leaves) and the distribution 
channels became vertically integrated with the manufacturing of snuff and cigars within the 
broader umbrella of the Tobacco Agency (see Figure 1). Quite simply, the strategy of the 
RTF within this overall structure was production-dominated in a monopolistic setting. And 
the monopolistic privilege enjoyed by the RTF was sustained through a manufacturing 
strategy that aimed to establish unambiguously the superiority of tobacco production within 
the RTF(both in terms of quality and cost) compared with alternative possibilities, whether 
illegal such as the black market or legitimate through the setting up of new factories. There 
was no real and legitimate competitors for de RTF to actively seek containing. As long as 
the RTF could demonstrate its superior quality and cosí. attributes, it deemed itself capable 
of pre-empting the possibility of new entry and of ensuring the survival of the RTF. This 
observation is borne out by the survival of the RTF as a monopoly for a long time, for it was 
not until the first decade of the next century that its virtual monopoly on cigar and snuff 
production was broken through the establishment of new factories in Alicante, Madrid and 
La Coruña and the significant expansion in the production capacity of de Cadiz factory. 
The aboye discussion suggests that an institutional theory framework such as that developed 
by Fligstein can illuminate our understanding of the contexts within which specific 
organizational actions are constituted, become institutionalized, and given meaning. In 
common with other institutional sociological approaches, this framework can also shed 
interesting light upon the role of accounting, as a form of organizational practice, in 
organizations. Within such a framework, it can be demonstrated that accounting practices 
matter irrespective of which view one holds of accounting. 
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Those who focus more upon formal structure and vic\V aceollnting praetiees primarily from 
an instrumentalist, functionalist angle can explain the emergence of new aceollnting series 
and the elimination of old series as a natural and logieal eonsequence of the changes in 
faetory loeation, design, capacity and structure. For example, one can point to the 
emergenee of aecounting praetiees seeking to improve the monitoring of production activities 
in the various produetion stages in the snuff faetory in terms of ensuring that aeeounting 
practices had to mirror the c1earer and more logical sequential production stages made 
possible by the design of the new production facilities in the New Factories. Similarly, it 
is possible to explain the development of new accounting practices emphasising the 
measurement of quality and the containment of production cost as a natural response to the 
need to stimulate greater demand for tobacco products and to increase the flow of tobacco 
revenue to the state Treasury. 
Equally, other interpretations of the role of accounting in organizations are not only possible 
but are even more consistent with an institutional theory perspective. For against the view 
that accounting is a neutral technology that aspires to mirror reality by presenting an 
objective measure of economic activity, there is also the view that accounting techniques, and 
information, are susceptible to different uses and interpretation, and in so doing, accounting 
creates, rather than mirrors, organizational reality. This different view of accounting has not 
only been promoted by sorne accounting academics (e.g. Burchell et al, 1980; Ezzamel and 
Hoskin, 1994) but has increasingly become recognised by others, such as sociologists: 
"Aceounting has a more fundamental role than the aeeounting as mirror 
version suggests. for it eonstitutes economic and organizational realities as 
much as it reflects them" (Carruthers. 1995. p. 321). 
Hence, according to that view accounting practices become consequential as they shape, 
process, and filter specific pieces of information that form the basis for action by several 
organizational actors. Accounting is able to achieve this by utilising the same attributes that 
are presumed to be deployed under the instrumentalist and functionalist view of accounting. 
Accounting is a technology of calculation; its practices convert qualities into quantities; they 
partition organizational activities into centres of calculation and what is made calculable is 
also rendered visible. Hence, systems of accountability can operate by utilising accounting 
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measures of human performance. But equally, what accounting measures fail to quantify can 
remain invisible and thcrefore escape accountability (Morgan and Willmott, 1993). To ihis 
effect, accounting can be used to determine what should be rendered accountable and what 
could be suppressed, thereby having a major impact on deciding what is deemed real and 
what is not. 
Within this view of accounting, the development of new accounting practices as well as their 
use can be explain in institutionalist terms. Thus, taking the position that organizations strive 
to sustain their legitimacy in society and to demonstrate their strict adherence to \Videly held 
norms and beliefs, it is possible to argue that the Tobacco Agency as wen as the RTF had 
a vested interest in creating an external visibility that reflected superior performance and high 
levels of efficiency. As new discontinuities or events emerged, such as the move to the New 
Factorics or the decline in total tobacco consumption, new accounting series were developed 
to demonstrate unequivocal1y to outside parties (the Crown; the public) that new measures 
have been taken by the Tobacco Agency and the RTF to improve quality and enhance 
efficiency. 
But the invention of new accounting practices is insufficient alone to create/sustain the myth 
of efficiency over time. In addition, these new practices (accounting series) have to be 
shown to be put to use, hence the creation of new accounting books for use both in the 
General Accounting Office and the factories themselves. For those inside and outside the 
RTF, the use of these new accounting practices is concrete evidence for the quest for better 
quality products and higher production efficiency. Moreover, once available inside the 
organization, new accounting calculations can be mobilised to rationalise past actions; as 
Carruthers (1995, p322) has remarked: 
"If accounts are consequential before and during decision making, they are 
also useful in the aftermath. This is when the rationality of decisions tums 
into the rationale for decisions" . 
This latter view, however, should not be taken. to imply exclusively that when new 
accounting practices are put into use, they only function as mechanisms for creating a myth 
of efficiency and rationality. As suggested earlier, accounting practices are consequential and 
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(bus even if they are deployed primarily to enhance external visibility they are simultaneously 
capable of being utilised to infonn decisions and influence/guide action. A major difference, 
however, from the instrumental, functionalist view is that viewing accounting as a means of 
organizational legitimation opens up the possibility that not only would acc.ounting practices 
be viewed as a rationalised myth, but also importantly they are developed and shaped by the 
very organizations which have to use them to demonstrate their legitimacy in society. Thus, 
in the case of this paper, the aboye interpretation implies that many of the new accounting 
series used by the RTF to signal externally the RTF's concern for quality and efficiency were 
developed in the first instance by the RTF itself (and similarly, the same could be said of the 
series developed by the Tobacco Agency as it strived to demonstrate its own competence in 
overseeing the activities of the RTF). Rence, the medium (the new accounting practices) 
becomes the message (concern for quality and efficiency). 
The preceding discussion shows that institutional sociological approaches, such as the one 
developed by Fligstein, are capable of offering interesting explanations of accounting 
practices, old or new, that are rooted in a broader understanding of the institutional settings 
of a particular organization. Moreover, when deployed to trace out accounting practices 
during a specific historical episode, such as the one covered in this paper, sociological 
institutional theory has the added advantage of affording the opportunity to examine the 
functioning/rise of accounting practices in different institutional contexts. As Scott (1995, 
p146) has observed: "It is difficult if not impossible to discern the effects of institutions on 
social structures and behaviour if all our cases are embedded in the same or very similar 
contexts" . 
It is important,.however, to note that the insights drawn from sociological institutional theory 
should be viewed with sorne caution. In particular, typologies such as the one proposed by 
Fligstein run the serious risk of stripping down sorne of the strongest claims made on behalf 
of sociological instituional theory. Such typologies seek to reduce much of the complexity 
inherent in organizational practices and abstract away from them to present a simpler and 
supposedly clearer view of the world. In so doing, however, tensions and possibly conflicts 
in the model arise. In the case of Fligstein's framework this may be reflected, and rather 
conveniently for the purposes of this paper, in the proposition that specific conceptions of 
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control givc rise to spccific strategies for organizational action, including accouming 
practices. \Ve will demonstrate our concern over Fligstein's framework by concentrating, 
by way 01' example, on two specific issues; the first relates to the extent to which there is 
demonstrable increase in emphasis on the use of accounting-based controls under diffcrcnt 
conceptions of control, and the second is concerned with the extent to which there is a 
significant improvement in the fortunes of certain professionals whose expertise may be 
deemed central to a particular conception of control. 
It will be recalled that in his framework Fligstein called attention to the significant rise in the 
use of accounting-based monitoring as the conception of control shifts from one based on 
sales and marketing to one based on finance. During this latter phase Fligstein contends that 
the firm "could be tightly controlled by strict accounting" (1993, pI6). This observation 
appears to be at odds with the archival evidence we have consulted. As we have argued 
earlier, the conception of control that emerged during the 1760-1790s was primarily 
manufacturing-based. As far as we can discem from the evidence, the intensified use of 
accounting-based controls after the 1760s seems to relate to the occurrence of a new set of 
events relating to the move to the New Factories, the decline in the consumption pattems of 
aggregate tobacco products and the significant change in product mix from snuff to cigars. 
During those three decades, emphasis remained focused, as previously, on manufacturing. 
Whether a shift in control conception towards finance would have resulted in an even greater 
reliance on the use of accounting controls is beyond our evidence. Nevertheless, there has 
been a shmificant increase in the number of accounting practices during the 1760-1790 period 
the majority of which were directly concemed with monitoring human perfonnance, and 
Fligstein's framework offers no compelling explicit explanation of such developments. 
Similarly, the rise in the eminence and fortunes of an accountant called Vallarin (who 
designed the cost accounting system in the RTF) as well as the high esteem in which senior 
accounting staff were held during that period is difficult to explain within the confines of 
Fligstein's framework. Although Vallerin never rose to the level of General Manager of the 
RTF (Fligstein has been concemed to document the rise of finance specialists to the highest 
managerial ranks in the USA during the finance conception of control) both his salary and 
rank were enhanced significantly. The post of Chief Accountant was among the most senior 
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and prestigious oceupations in the RTF, for eXCl111ple, the Chief Aceountant deputised for tlle 
Superintendent of tlle RTF when the latter was absent. In 1773, Vallarin was an Assistant 
Aecountant with a salary of 833 Reales per month. In 1774, Clement de Castro, the Cllief 
Aeeountant and Val1arin's superior was appointed Acting Superintendent of tlle RTF. 
Beeause the tradition of the RTF at that time was for the post of Chief Aeeountant to be 
restrieted to members of the Knighthood and beeause Val1arin did not belong to the upper 
erost of Spanish society, he was initially appointed in 1774 as Aeting Chief Accountant but 
with the same salary of 833 Reales per month that he was paid previously instead of the 
salary of 1,583 Reales paid to his predecessor. 
In 1780, after being involved in a sueeessful production experiment aimed at increasing 
production levels, Vallarin was appointed Chief Accountant with a salary of 2,000 Reales, 
more than twice his previous salary and 417 Reales higher than the salary of his predecessor. 
To appreciate the extent of Vallarin's financial reward, it is relevant to compare his salary 
history to that of the influential General Inspector Portocarrero. In 1778, when the 
production experiment was conducted, Portoearrero's salary was 4,166 Reales per month, 
more than two and a half times the salary of the Chief Accountant at that point in time. In 
1779, while Vallarin was Acting Chief Accountant at a salary of 833 Reales, Portocarrero's 
salary was reduced to 2,500 Reales. Once Portocarrero left his post later on in 1779, the 
salary of General Inspector was redueed further to 1,666 Reales, exactly twice as much as 
Vallarin's salary in that year. In 1780, the year when Vallarin was appointed Chief 
Aecountant, the salary of General Inspector was down to a mere 833 Reales, well under half 
Vallarin' s new salary. 
The dynamics of the salary scenario described aboye raise several interesting questions: 
Given the success of the produetion experiment, why was the salary of the General Inspector 
reduced so significantly (ultimately, to only 20% of its level in 1778)? What precise reasons 
lead to the elevation of the salary of Chief Accountant in 1780 from 1,583 Reales to 2,000 
Reales? Was that because of a perceived increased importance of the post of Chief 
Accountant? Or was the increase in salary more of a reflection of the personal capabilities 
of Vallarin? These, and similar questions are intriguing but the lack of evidence in the 
archives renders it impossible to address them in a meaningful manner. Yet it is clear that 
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Vallarin was handsomely rcwarded both finallcialIy anJ in terms of career progression. 
Quite simply, ValIarin's personal fortunes, and those of the post 01' Chief Accountant, rose 
with the emergence and rise of cost accounting witbin the RTF. 
Yet, the historical evidence suggests that at that time (1760-1790) the RTF had not 
'graduated' through the four successive conceptions of control suggested by Fligstein; from 
direct control of competitors, through manufacturing control and sales and marketing control 
ultimately to finance control. This supposedly clear cut transitional process is not discernible 
in the historical chronology of the RTF from its inception in the late 17th century and over 
a whole century. What we discern instead is an increased focus on production 
simultaneously with more extensive use of accounting calculations. Rather than a single-
focused and crystallized conception of control during a particular corporate era, as Fligstein 
argues, we discern, if anything, multiple and more complex conceptions of control in which 
accounting most frequently (almost invariably) played a crucial role. 
This, we contend, is a crucial observation. For rather than viewing the emergence of 
accounting practices purely as the natural response to specific shifts in the conception of 
organizational control, we see accounting as an important mode of monitoring perfonnance 
in a variety of organizational settings. In this respect, our views are significantly different 
not onIy from those of Fligstein but also from the views of the academic orthodoxy 
concerned with accounting history. Thus, Pollard (1965) found little evidence on the use of 
cost accounting to guide decision making in British finns during the industrial revolution and 
has sunnised that this was due to the prevalence of high profit margins and the absence of 
competition. Following in his footsteps Edwards and Newell (1991) and Fleischman and 
Parker (1991) have suggested that intensive competition provides the stimulus for the use of 
cost calculations in order to improve finn efficiency and to strengthen its competitive 
position. The argument here is parallel to that advanced by Fligstein; specific competitive 
settings give rise to a significantIy greater use of cost accounting calculations. 
The evidence drawn from the archives of the RTF and reported in this paper clearly departs 
from the aboye contention. First, we have clear evidence of regular use of accounting 
calculations in a monopolistic setting thereby suggesting that the use of accounting in 
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organizations is not restricted to competitive settings. Second, we observe much greater 
intensification in the use of cost accounting in the RTF post-1760 which we can link to the 
occurrcnce of specific events, such as lhe move to the Ncw Factorics, etc. While, as 
suggested earlier, it is plausible to argue that these events gave rise to the emergence and use 
of new accounting practices to improve overall factory performance (and this may have 
indeed been the case in many instances), we propose that an explanation of these new 
accounting practices needs to extend beyond this restrictive view. Institutional sociological 
theory has offered one such possible extension; new accounting practices may emerge purely 
as a means for enhancing the external legitimacy of the organization. Our discussion aboye 
suggests that such need for external legitimacy is not necessarily restricted to organizations 
operating in highly competitive settings but could be extended to monopolistic situations. 
Indeed, it is more likely that monopolistic organizations, such as the RTF, are under much 
greater pressure to demonstrate to external constituencies the legitimacy and rationality of 
their actions given the potent privileges such monopolies normally enjoy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This papel' traced out the emergence of new accounting practices over the period 1760-1790 
in the Royal Tobacco Factory (RTF), Seville, which was set up as the sole legitimate tobacco 
producer in Spain from the late 17th century onwards. During the period under study, three 
sets of events occurred. First, tobacco production was moved from the old San Pedro 
Factory to the New Factories, which were purpose-built and had much larger production 
capacity compared to the San Pedro Factory. Second, there was a decline in the total 
consumption of tobacco, which became particularly sharp after the 1770s. Third, there was 
pressure to increase tobacco revenue to please the Crown whilst keeping prices down and 
product quality high to deter entry. The papel' examines these events from the perspective 
of sociological institutional theory, in particular, a framework developed by Fligstein, to 
establish the extent to which the emergence of new accounting practices can be linked to 
these events. 
The original archival material on which this papel' draws shows that prior to the period 
examined here, thirty three accounting series were in use detailing practices undertaken both 
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in the General Accounting Office and in the factories of the RTF. During the period under 
investigation, six series were abandoned and 44 were invented so that by 1790 more lhan 
seventy series were in operation. By far thc greatest majority of the new accounting series 
dealt with factory matters, in particular, the process-like, standardized snuff factory. Many 
of the new accounting practices mirrored the production flow that became' much clearer in 
the New Factories, while others were concerned with overall factory productivity and product 
quality. 
It was both possible and plausible to locate these new accounting practices within the 
framework of institutional sociology. Thus, while recognising the real possibility that these 
practices were developed with the intent of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
RTF, the papel' suggests that these new accounting practices may have been aimed at 
enhancing the external legitimacy of the RTF and protecting its monopolistic hold over 
tobacco production in Spain. The papel' also suggests that Fligstein's framework of 
sequential conceptions of control in the history organizations may be both restrictive and 
over-simplified. Specifically, during the historical episode examined in this papel' there was 
much emphasis placed upon manufacturing but also simultaneously upon greater use of newly 
developed, more intensified, and far more elaborate accounting calculations. The archives 
also contain clear evidence to suggest that the post of Chief Accountant in the RTF was 
extremely prestigious, as indicated by the high salary and standing of Manuel Vallarin, the 
accountant who designed the cost accounting system in the RTF. In Fligstein's framework, 
such increase in the use of accounting for monitoring purposes and rise in the fortunes of 
senior accounting staff are premised to occur on1y beyond the sales and marketing conception 
of control which Fligstein perceives to emerge after the manufacturing conception of control. 
Hence, the archival evidence cited in this papel' would at least suggest that Fligstein's 
framework is in need of important revisions. More radically, this papel' agues that there is 
a serious danger that lurks in typologies such as the one proposed by Fligstein, in 
conceptualizing organizational action. Such typologies tend to be restrictive by imposing 
specific matchings between a particular typology and expected organizational action (e.g. 
accounting practices) which may be difficult to sustain in practice. It may be that, contrary 
to Fligstein's argument, the intensity with which accounting practices get used and/or the 
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magnitude of ne\\' and emerging accounting practices have lcss to do with the dominance of 
specific conceptions of control. 
In common with research informed by sociological institutional theory, the ~resent paper has 
limitations that could be addressed by future researchers (see Scott, 1995). First, the period 
examined here is fairly short compared to the whole life span of many organizations. Future 
researchers may be able in certain instances to examine the life course of organizations in 
order to gain a better understanding of the extent to which specific practices (such as 
accounting) persist over time. Second, the archival evidence examined here does not capture 
ful1y the relation between institutional and organizational processes; an area that future 
researchers may be more capable of illuminating. Final1y, this study is concerned with a 
specific institutional setting. There is need for comparative studies dealing with differing 
institutional contexts to enhance our understanding of the extent to which certain accounting 
practices are embedded in, but also strongly shape, the institutional setting of an 
organization. 
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